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Abstract
Exploring the implementation blackbox from a perspective that considers embedded practices of
power is critical to understand the policy process. However, the literature is scarce on this subject.
To address the paucity of explicit analyses of everyday politics and power in health policy implemen-
tation, this article presents the experience of implementing a flagship health policy in India. Janani
Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK), launched in the year 2011, has not been able to fully deliver its
promises of providing free maternal and child health services in public hospitals. To examine how
power practices, influence implementation, we undertook a qualitative analysis of JSSK implementa-
tion in one state of India. We drew on an actor-oriented perspective of development and used ‘actor
interface analysis’ to guide the study design and analysis. Data collection included in-depth inter-
views of implementing actors and JSSK service recipients, document review and observations of
actor interactions. A framework analysis method was used for analysing data, and the framework
used was founded on the constructs of actor lifeworlds, which help understand the often neglected
and lived realities of policy actors. The findings illustrate that implementation was both strengthened
and constrained by practices of power at various interface encounters. The implementation decisions
and actions were influenced by power struggles such as domination, control, resistance, contest-
ation, facilitation and collaboration. Such practices were rooted in: Social and organizational power
relationships like organizational hierarchies and social positions; personal concerns or characteristics
like interests, attitudes and previous experiences and the worldviews of actors constructed by social
and ideological paradigms like their values and beliefs. Application of ‘actor interface analysis’ and
further nuancing of the concept of ‘actor lifeworlds’ to understand the origin of practices of power
can be useful for understanding the influence of everyday power and politics on the policy process.
Keywords: Health policy, health services research, health systems research, implementation, power, policy implementation,
policy analysis, framework, qualitative research, policy process
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Introduction
Implementation of health policies is the blackbox that holds many
answers to the questions of how policies can meet their intent and
how intended users of the policy see them in practice.
Implementation has been widely recognized as a central area for
health policy analysis (Gilson et al., 2018) and has been one of the
drivers shaping the field of health policy and systems research
(Bennett et al., 2011, 2018). Implementation is recognized as a crit-
ical phase in the policy process and is one of the four phases in pol-
icy cycle according to the ‘stages heuristics’ model (Laswell, 1956;
Brewer and DeLeon, 1983; Weible et al., 2012). Broadly, all policy
processes are contingent on wider socio-political contexts and are
shaped by the interaction of involved actors, their knowledge and
power dynamics, as well as by aspects of decision making and the
policies in question (Walt and Gilson, 1994). A people-oriented ap-
proach that considers human agency and attributes at the centre of
health systems and health policy has, thus, been recognized as im-
portant in transforming the practice of health systems and policy
(Sheikh et al., 2014). Power is at the heart of every policy process
(Erasmus and Gilson, 2008; Gilson and Raphaely, 2008; Lee, 2015).
Health policy actors use their power and agency to engage in con-
testation, negotiation and collaboration, giving real-life direction to
the policy process. Yet few studies purposefully and fully examine
the practices of power applied by policy actors and how they shape
the implementation. Three recent reviews—a review of discretionary
power by frontline workers and managers, the health policy analysis
reader and ten best resources on power, have highlighted the need
for more theoretically diverse studies that are focused specifically on
the local practice knowledge, around the values and meanings that
influence these micro-practices of power (Gilson et al., 2014, 2018;
Sriram et al., 2018). Moreover, the implementation of health poli-
cies has been less commonly studied for understanding the influence
of actors’ agency and power, their interactions and relationships and
how actors assemble the surrounding structures and contexts in
LMICs (Sheikh and Porter, 2010; Lehmann and Gilson, 2013;
Sheikh et al., 2014; Barasa et al., 2016) and respond to implementa-
tion needs.
Some of the theoretical domains used in the broader policy im-
plementation literature which draw both from top down (Pressman
and Wildavsky, 1973; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) and bottom up
(Lipsky, 1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Malik et al., 2014) views of
implementation (Hupe and Hill, 2016) can arguably enrich the field.
This could be achieved by not only considering implementation
processes and contexts (Walt and Gilson, 1994) but also examining
agency, decisions, actions and power dynamics of actors as informed
by their beliefs, values, interests, motives and norms (Gilson et al.,
2011; Hudson and Lefttwich, 2014; Sheikh et al., 2014).
Development sociologist, Normal Long in his work on actor-
oriented perspectives of development interventions (Long, 2001),
has illustrated how the lived experiences of policy actors, their inter-
actions and power struggles, shape policy implementation in a way
that it is practised differently from its original blueprint (Long,
2001; Long and Liu, 2009). This paper attempts to contribute in
this direction. It presents an implementation analysis of one of the
flagship policies in maternal and child health in India, using an
actor-oriented perspective (Long, 1989). The paper illustrates how
power struggles of actors influenced the implementation of this pol-
icy using actor interface analysis (Long, 2001).
We studied the implementation of Janani Shishu Suraksha
Karyakram (JSSK), which translates to ‘mother and child safety
scheme’. JSSK, a scheme launched by the government of India,
promised completely ‘free’ maternal and child health services in pub-
lic hospitals in India in the year 2011. However, JSSK service users
still spend money out of their pockets [Government of India, 2014;
Tyagi et al., 2016; Indian Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS)
and ICF, 2017]. The reasons behind these continued expenses have
not been discussed, most of which could be related to implementa-
tion fallacies (Sabatier, 1986).
Trying to understand this gap between the policy promise and
policy practice, our broader study analysed the overall influences on
implementation of JSSK. This paper specifically presents the role of
actor relationships and power in the implementation of JSSK using
actor interface analysis (Long, 1989, 2001).
Methods
Considering that there could be multiple coexisting possibilities that
would affect the implementation course of JSSK, we used a flexible,
qualitative study design (Robson, 2009) to approach this inquiry.
To get into the depths of this issue and build rich insights about im-
plementation, we narrowed down the study geography to one
Indian state as a case (Yin, 1999) of JSSK implementation. We chose
the state of Himachal Pradesh (HP), as HP was one of the first states
to adopt JSSK. But, the state incurred higher than the national aver-
age of out of pocket expenses on free services promised under JSSK,
after more than 5 years of implementation (Government of India,
2014; IIPS, 2017). The approach to data collection, analysis and use
of theory was reflectively considered based on the first round of
fieldwork, as we noticed actor relationships and power dynamics
emerging as one of the dominant features of JSSK implementation.
We drew upon the framework analysis approach (Ritchie and
KEY MESSAGES
• This analysis illustrates that health policy implementation is not merely a function of framing implementation procedures but is
significantly influenced by the actor relationships and power struggles, which are rooted in the lived experiences of actors.
• Actor interface analysis provides an entry point to locate practices of power in interface encounters. It can help understanding of the
nature of power practices as well as their influence on health policy implementation.
• Actor lifeworlds as a concept considers the often neglected and lived realities of policy actors manifesting in everyday politics and
power practices. These include—power relationships based in organizational and social positions; personal characteristics such as
interests, attitudes and experiences and socially constructed worldviews and ideologies of actors.
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Spencer, 1994) and developed a framework for analysis, based on
the categorization of ‘actor lifeworlds’ (Table 1). This categoriza-
tion was informed by the ‘elements of actor interface analysis’
(Long, 2001; Asian Productivity Organization, 2003). For this
study, we considered practices of power as acts of influencing deci-
sions or actions of actors and observed power as a diffused concept
used in the Foucauldian idea (Gordon and Marshall, 1980.) The
acts of influencing each other’s actions were guided by the power
struggles at the actor interfaces and drawing on elements of actor
interface analysis, we included practices of domination, control, re-
sistance, contestation, collaboration and negotiation as practices of
power (Long, 2001).
We illustrate below, how actor interface analysis was operation-
alized in this study.
Steps in conducting actor interface analysis
As a first step, we developed a guiding framework, as shown in
Table 1, to guide the analysis of practices of power. This framework
uses the constructs of routine social realities of actors, called ‘actor
lifeworlds’ which are generally neglected in policy interventions and
which create a basis of engagement of policy actors in actor interfa-
ces (Long, 2001). Lifeworld term was used by Schutz (1962) ‘to de-
pict the “lived-in” and “taken-for-granted” world of the social
actors’ and was later elaborated upon by Schutz and Luckmann,
(1973) . These social realities or lived experiences of actors could be
based in their more visible relations of power such as social and or-
ganizational positions; can be a construct of actors’ personal charac-
teristics or concerns or could be related to worldviews informed by
actors’ social, cultural or ideological standings. Each of these catego-
ries could have multiple contributing characteristics, as depicted in
our framework of actor lifeworlds in Table 1. However, it is worth-
while to clarify here that these categories and elements within these
categories are not mutually exclusive, overlap in some constructs
and influence each other.
As a next step, we tailored our data collection to capture not
only the practices of power but also the lived experiences of actors
guided by actor lifeworlds framework. The data collection included
iterative in-depth interviews (IDIs), document reviews and observa-
tions of actor interactions. IDIs covered a range of implementing
actors from state and district levels, including technocrats and
bureaucrats, managers, service providers and JSSK beneficiaries
(Table 2). The questions included in IDIs focused on JSSK related
experiences of participants and enquired in detail about partici-
pants’ interactions with other actors in relation to implementation
decisions and as well as their interests, experiences, beliefs, relation-
ships, etc. (see Supplementary file S1).
As shown in Table 3, we observed interactions of service pro-
viders with each other and with JSSK clients in health facilities,
observed interactions of managers in state and district offices and
attended official meetings to note interaction patterns and decision-
making processes. The documents available in the public domain
were accessed, and specific letters were accessed from offices on re-
quest. The JSSK guidelines, 15 state letters and four media reports
were reviewed.
We transcribed the interviews and made summary notes from
observational data and documents. We used a software, ‘Dedoose
for qualitative analysis’, version 8.2.14 for coding, organizing and
linking data across files. Coding was done by the first author and
supported by a research consultant. The consultant first coded a few
transcripts with the first author and independently coded other tran-
scripts based on this learning. Some files were independently coded
by a field expert for validity purposes. The codes and themes were
later discussed together to arrive on a consensus. We first coded the
transcribed data to map the procedures which were laid down for
JSSK. As the next step in coding, we interpretively identified actor
Table 1 Actor lifeworlds: a framework for contributing reasons for practices of power in actor interfaces formed in a policy process
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Values, beliefs, ideologies, moral and
ethical positions, organizational
and cultural norms and patterns
Adapted from Long (2001).
Table 2 In depth interviews
Participants category IDIs Characteristics included
Care givers of JSSK beneficiaries 8 Maternity and infant wards; spent money/did not spend money; levels of health facilities
Staff nurses 7 Labour, neonatal and infant care units; contractual and regular staff; early career, mid and late
in career stages
Birth attendants (Dai) 2 Near retirement
Administrative nurses 3 Mid-career to near retirement; Matron and Ward in-charges; level of health facilities
Health facility in-charges 4 Medical college hospital, district hospital and subdistrict hospitals
Store in charge 2 Management committee member, store in charge, purchase committee member
Practicing clinicians 8 Obstetricians, Paediatricians, Radiologists, non-specialist doctors from different level of facilities
Block medical officers 5 Also served as facility in-charges
District level officers 4 District managers and programme nodal persons
State level officers 8 Programme managers and officers (including state directors, bureaucrats)
Total IDIs 51 About 22 h of recording and 8 h of non-recorded (summarized) interviews
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interfaces formed during implementation course by applying ‘type
of interface’ codes to actor interactions and sub-coded practices of
power into the acts of collaboration, control, domination, resist-
ance, negotiation and contestations. The next significant step in this
process was to examine lived experiences of actors, which we coded
into three broad categories of ‘actor lifeworlds’. Within each life-
world category, we sub-coded the contributory elements, as shown
in Table 1. The effects of power practices were organized in two
broad categories—strengthening of implementation (helping the de-
livery of policy promises) and contrasting the implementation (thin-
ning of policy intent).
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the author’s
institute.
Results
JSSK implementation journey and main challenges
faced
HP was one of the early adopters of JSSK as the state chief minister
announced JSSK entitlements soon after JSSK guidelines were avail-
able. JSSK rollout was initiated with an official letter and empha-
sized on ‘assuring nil out of pocket expenses’ from intended
beneficiaries of JSSK in all government health facilities in the state.
To make the promised services available for free in all public hospi-
tals, the state framed new procedures and guidelines for the provi-
sion of these services in all public facilities. For example, to make
the required medicines available in health facilities, a new procure-
ment process was laid down based on the list of medicines and con-
sumables, which was based on JSSK guidelines from the centre. This
medicine list and procurement guidelines were updated later at
many points. Similarly, for diagnostic tests, all user charges for the
tests available within the hospital were removed, but all the labora-
tory and radiology services required under JSSK were not available
in most facilities. After a couple of years, laboratory services in pub-
lic hospitals were outsourced to a private company, which made
most diagnostic tests available in the hospitals and charges for these
were exempted for JSSK beneficiaries. For ensuring free availability
of ultrasonography services to all clients, private tie-ups were
attempted with occasional success. Likewise, for free transport serv-
ices, ambulances in health facilities were much less in number com-
pared with requirements of JSSK. Later, the state purchased an
outsourced private ambulance service for all emergencies as a cen-
tralized ambulance system and a special drop back to home ambu-
lance service was also initiated in the year 2014.
However, with successes in some areas, the full potential of these
provisions could not be achieved because of inconsistencies in their
delivery even in the better-performing facilities. This often left out
many beneficiaries, who still paid money from their pockets, against
JSSK promises. Overall, some of the major challenges faced for
ensuring free drugs and consumables, diagnostic tests and transport
services were:
1. Inadequate availability and inconsistent delivery of items in the
JSSK drugs and consumable lists in some districts and health
facilities especially in the larger hospitals.
2. Ultrasonography (USG) services remained available only at
larger hospitals, which made beneficiaries travel big distances to
avail USG services and private USG service providers outside
these hospitals bloomed in most places.
3. While transport services were available to many clients, these
were also inconsistent, particularly in cases of inter-facility
transfers and drop back services to the home.
Findings from the overall enquiry of JSSK implementation sug-
gest that most of these problems had their roots beyond framing im-
plementation guidelines and procedures. These were predominantly
influenced by power practices of actors across levels of the health
system; the overall context of the state health system; politics; cor-
ruption; interaction of JSSK with other policies and programmes
and management of JSSK implementation processes including guid-
ing procedures, monitoring, reporting and measurement processes.
However, as the focus of this paper remains on practices of power
which we discuss below.
Actor interfaces, practices of power observed
Table 4 outlines some key examples of actor interfaces and prac-
tices of power which were identified in this experience and which
influenced implementation related decisions and actions. These
interfaces were formed in relation to an implementation step or a
procedure. The actors involved in JSSK implementation ranged
from ministers and senior officers from central government as well
as the state directors and managers from the state health depart-
ment and NHM, district level managers, health facility managers
and service providers (doctors, nurses and traditional birth at-
tendants in some cases). The communities themselves were an
integral part of implementation by availing JSSK services and at
times influenced the decisions and actions of health service pro-
viders. Moreover, private service providers, often concentrated
outside public hospitals, played an indirect role in shaping the
implementation.
The practices of power on various types of interfaces are shown
in the first column of Table 4, and the second column shows various
practices of power in relation to implementation decisions and
actions.
Table 3 Observations and documents reviewed
Observations (nonparticipant)
Observed sites Hours Observation focus
PNC Ward, SNCU, review meetings (state, district),
state level training, offices (NHM, facility in charge,
matron)
27 Setting, work atmosphere, interaction patterns (tensions, negotiations,
collaborations, etc.), any JSSK relevant events (service delivery,
procedures, demands, response, grievances, resolution, etc.)
Documents collected
JSSK guidelines (national, state)
Letters and office correspondence on JSSK—NHM and HP Govt website
Some letters related to specific information from state NHM office—accessed on request
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The lifeworlds of actors underpinning the actor
interfaces and practices of power
The actor interfaces formed in this experience and the practices of
power noted on these interfaces were underpinned by a variety of
lifeworld experiences of actors, which are illustrated in Table 5. The
lifeworld analysis is divided into three lifeworld categories as guided
by Table 1. However, it is important to note that these categories of
lifeworlds are not mutually exclusive and interact as well as overlap
with each other as also mentioned in the ‘Methods’ section. Also,
most practices of power could be underpinned by multiple lifeworld
experiences as depicted in Table 5 below.
Positional power relationships of actors
Often visible relationships of power that were embedded in the or-
ganizational and social positions of actors influenced how actors
interacted with each other, in relation to a policy issue. For example,
at an interface of state and central officers related to the decision of
JSSK rollout in HP, practices of domination and control by politi-
cians and central actors were observed as seen in the example
below:
Now, what can I do, if my entire programmatic funding is going
to come from the Government of India! . . . . . .. So we willy-nilly
fall in line with the national agenda. That is how. . .most states
have operated. Schemes like JSSK, despite not being our main
priority, we must implement them. . . And we also must keep
bringing money to the state, to save our reputations (Senior
officer—1).
In another interface encounter related to politics of health service
delivery, private lobbies negotiated with mangers, doctors and poli-
ticians to ensure that their medicines and tests are purchased by ei-
ther patients or the governments themselves. The influential power
of private lobbies and control on decision making of politicians
along with personal financial benefits system actors came together
to allow the continuation of this arrangement as seen in below ex-
ample (Table 5):
In the beginning, it was a rebellion kind of a situation from pri-
vate shops. They would tell us, . . . why are you bringing this free
system here, then they were making the local ministers call . . .
that why are you giving medicines from the hospital? (Middle
manager—2).
Beneficiaries held the least power in their position in service de-
livery chain because of their social positions, lack of knowledge
compared with service providers and being dependent on them to
avail promised entitlements of JSSK. While in most cases, beneficia-
ries consented to what was provided, they, less commonly, also
exerted pressure on the service providers to avail quality services.
Resourcefulness, connections with influential people and politicians
and access to better information were the reasons which enabled
beneficiaries to demand better services (Table 5).
Table 4 Examples of actor interfaces and practices of power in JSSK implementation
Example of interfaces observed Practices of power and related implementation issue
Political interfaces (centre-state/politician-managers/managers-private
owners)
Centre domination on policy and programmatic agenda over the decision
of JSSK rollout in HP
Resistance and contestations by private service providers against free
medicines and tests in public hospitals
Negotiations by managers with private providers
Interfaces among middle managers across levels (facility/district/state) Resistance by facility managers to follow top down instructions on JSSK
documentation and reporting
Contestation for getting credit about delivering free services among state
and district managers
State domination over reporting needs
Collaboration for local problem solving and implementation needs for
policy among some managers
Top down push by state to control implementation steps and guidelines,
Resistance and avoidance by facility managers
Interfaces among doctors and managers in health facilities Resistance of doctors towards a restrictive medicine list; Resistance of
doctors for using generic drugs
Negotiations and contestations from doctors about need of higher end
and more modern medicines citing quality issues
Resistance related to prescription of ultrasonography to pregnant
women
Resistance from doctors for involvement in national programmes
Interfaces among nurses and managers health facilities Control of administrators on resources
Negotiations by nurses for availability of medicines
Contestation and negotiation by nurses with doctors on choice of free
medicines and tests for patients
Interfaces among beneficiaries and service providers (doctors/nurses/
managers)
Doctors facilitation for service delivery to clients
Domination of doctors and nurses on service delivery decisions (sending
a client away)
Domination of doctors on patient’s choice for medicines or treatment
and consent from patients
Negotiations and contestations of beneficiary and managers for better
quality or more advanced services or services bypassing the guidelines
Doctor and service provider control over providing USG service and
client negotiations for USG service access
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Patients, sometimes, don’t want to stay for 48 h after child-
birth. . .. They say that send us back immediately, so we must tell
as per guidelines, that if you don’t stay for 48 h, we can’t send
you by 102 (Drop back service ambulance). But now, somewhere
from above this pressure comes, phones start coming. . .to drop
her back home . . . send her by the vehicle. So we have to do that
(Nurse—1).
Personal concerns or characteristics
We found many interfaces where managers engaged in cooperation
and collaboration with each other to make feasible implementation
decisions and acted together to solve problems. While some of such
collaboration was related to the organizational powers, most of it
came from personal characteristics, previous experiences and ideo-
logical belief in a participatory and collaborative work environment.
As one state manager highlighted:
No, the difference of opinion is everywhere. You cannot say that
everybody thinks the same way, right? But we try to hear every-
one and support districts. And like from the state level, we sat
and hand-held district teams, I think the districts ones also did
the same thing with the health facilities. As a result of which
many problems of JSSK, were resolved (Middle manager—1).
The lifeworld experience of managers, in this case, emanated
from an attitude of solving problems (personal characteristics) and a
belief in JSSK as a useful policy for communities (individual
understanding).
Contrary to this experience, at one interface we noted that facil-
ity managers avoided displaying JSSK entitlements and list of medi-
cines available at facilities and many facilities resisted doing it
(Table 4). Origin of this practice of resistance from facility managers
was based in their personal experience as they had faced pressure
from service users earlier when they had displayed another policy
benefit but could not provide it for lack of resources. Partly, this
was also an organizational power exercise as the state managers, as
well as district managers, had to report whether facilities have dis-
played the entitlements and free medicine lists (Table 5). This was
an interface of bottom up resistance and negotiation at the end of
district and subdistrict managers, influenced by their previous expe-
riences as well as organizational positions.
. . . In reality, we have not been able to give JSSK widespread
publicity. . .The meaning of giving widespread publicity was this
that we told them (district and facility managers) that you display
the list of free medicines in your hospital. . . . now if they display
and patients demand it . . . their . . . accountability . . . increases
. . .. So obviously . . . they were . . . apprehensive . . .! (Middle
manager—1).
From the state manager’s point of view, this was a result of un-
willingness and a lacklustre attitude of districts. But the district
Table 5 Type of power practices and contributing actor lifeworlds
Types of power practices observed at
actor interfaces
Underpinning lifeworld elements
Positional power relations Personal concerns/characteristics Social, cultural, ideological
standpoints
Centre actors’ domination on policy
and programmatic agenda
Organizational power and budgetary
control of politicians and central
actors
Resistance, contestations and negoti-
ation by private service providers,
Influential social positions and
cumulative power of private
lobbies
Personal interests of local politi-
cians, managers and doctors in
kickbacks
Resistance to follow top down
instructions on JSSK documenta-
tion and reporting
Social positions of being junior and
senior in profession
Unwillingness and non-cooperating
attitude of some managers; need
for recognition and credit for
managers
Domination of doctors and nurses on
service delivery decisions (sending
a client away)
Professional autonomy on clinical
decisions of doctors
Domination of doctors on patient’s
choice for medicines or treatment
and consent from patients
Professional position, social
positions of influence of doctor;
Low knowledge of patients
Negotiations and contestations of
beneficiary and managers for
better quality
More informed clients and exercising
knowledge, use of social influence
by patients
Beneficiary belief in patient rights
and entitlements
Doctor and facility control over
availability of USG services and
client negotiations
Organizational and professional
(medical) power of doctors
Absence of choice and personal
need of patients to avail services
from private; financial interest of
doctors
Accepted norm for not being
accountable to patient needs;
Belief in incentivization to
doctors as a systems
responsibility
Collaboration, facilitation for local
problem solving and implantation
needs for policy
Commitment, energy, problem
solving attitude of one manager
Faith in participatory and
collaborative management of a
manager
Doctors facilitation for service
delivery (all services to a client)
Doctor’s professional ethics and
moral sense of duty towards
society and poor
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managers indicated that this was a struggle to resist the top down
and authoritative instructions to implement programmes (without
consulting them), many of which came informally. The contrasting
view of the district managers emanated from previous their previous
experiences where the suggestions they offered related to implemen-
tation were not considered by the state managers. This led to a feel-
ing of frustration and district officers started avoiding state
instructions. Partly, this was also linked to organizational positions
of power of state managers and was a personal coping mechanism
of district managers to deal with such pressures (Table 5). One sub-
district level manager, who was also a facility in charge (and a clin-
ician) mentioned:
We used to give suggestions earlier also; we give suggestions even
now. . .And there is another thing that the technical review and
decisions are made by the state only, we have no role in improv-
ing technical guidance. We are asked only to give implementation
solutions and results (Middle manager—3).
Like power struggles within managers, doctors and managers
also had lifeworld differences as well as commonalities. Doctors
negotiated for incentives on ultrasonography services as radiologists
were a scarce entity, and they would earn much higher if worked in
private setups. Similarly, on the provision of prescribing the medi-
cines only from the JSSK list, doctors, especially who worked at big-
ger hospitals such as medical colleges, resisted sticking to policy
guidance. Their individual financial interests and peer comparison
with earning more money manifested through these negotiations
and resistance (Table 5). One can argue that these are the medical
powers of the doctors used for this type of resistance. However, we
assigned the personal lifeworld category here as the personal
motives, especially the financial interests of doctors appeared to
drive this resistance. This resistance was facilitated by their organ-
izational or medical powers, which is an interaction of two lifeworld
categories. At times doctors’ professional training and their recogni-
tion as an able specialized clinician also mattered. We see these per-
sonal characteristics in the examples below:
They (pregnant women) are giving Rs. 1200, Rs. 2400 to private
for all their ultrasounds. I am myself looking for regulation for
this. If I was a radiologist, I would have no incentive for doing
ultrasound . . .. even if I do 100 ultrasounds in a day, I will have
no incentive. But if I send 100 ultrasounds outside, I will get min-
imum Rs. 10 000 indirectly. I have been telling this to state, but
they don’t listen (Obstetrician—3).
Social, cultural and ideological worldviews
In response to a policy implementation step, actors make meanings
of their social, cultural, moral, ethical and ideological standpoints,
which guides their actions. On one such experience, a doctor
ensured completely free treatment of a delivering mother and her
baby. This was linked to professional and moral ethics, a sense of
duty towards society and the professional autonomy of doctors on
delivering such services (Table 5).
. . . I haven’t paid any money in this hospital, and we are here for
about 14 days now. My baby was borne by operation, and since
then she is admitted here. Everything has been free for us. The
doctor who admitted us immediately decided to perform an oper-
ation for delivery . . .. This is my 2nd baby, but after four abor-
tions before this. We are very poor. If, he didn’t help us, God
knows what will happen to us (Beneficiary—1).
This did not only seem to be a medical emergency to me, but I
realised that the patient was very poor, and her husband couldn’t
afford anything by himself. It was a premature delivery, and I
thought it was my duty to provide them with everything which
was available to us. If the government is providing free services,
why should we bother about anything (Obstetrician—1).
In a different experience, professionally accepted practice of pre-
scribing branded medicines and organizational norms of not being
accountable to patients and communities played out in many situa-
tions where decisions for prescribing medicines and tests from out-
side market and referral to higher facilities were taken. Contrary to
what we observed in the example above, we noticed a patient being
referred to a higher facility twice and was asked to get an ultrasound
done outside. The pregnant woman eventually delivered in a private
hospital on the way to a medical college hospital.
We were referred to the district hospital for delivery from our
area by a doctor saying that the operation will be needed for de-
livery. At district hospital, we were not admitted and asked to go
to medical college. On the way, my wife had severe labor pains,
and we rushed to a private hospital in a hurry, where a normal
delivery happened (Beneficiary—2).
In other examples, an ideological view and belief of a manager in
participatory management helped in bringing the community to-
gether to get donations for purchasing an ambulance for the hos-
pital. Similarly, in one case, a nurse, because of her belief in the
patient’s right to get services for free, resisted doctor’s prescription
for branded medicines when generic medicines were available in the
hospital.
How did power struggles in actor interfaces affect JSSK
implementation?
Strengthening of implementation and delivering policy promises
Some of the power dynamics helped to strengthen the implementa-
tion by facilitating decision making, streamlining of guidelines and
procedures, fostered innovative solutions to local problems,
improved demand from clients and subsequently ensured delivery of
JSSK entitlements to many intended service users. At times, more
powerful actors, because of their hierarchical positions clubbed with
personal commitment and attitude, could drive the implementation
process where it was stuck or moved slow. The authoritative power
of such actors, when used constructively, allowed implementation
decisions to happen less ambiguously. For instance, quick and clear
decision making of one state officer led to the solution of persisting
problems, which resulted in reduced complains of expenses made by
beneficiaries.
We had an officer, who soon after coming to office, cleaned up
many ambiguities in JSSK implementation procedures. The state
established a procurement cell, we received special drop back
ambulances from the center, we expanded the JSSK list of medi-
cines, our reporting and accounting improved. But we eventually
persisted with same problems of ultrasound not being provided,
medicines not available etc.. . . perhaps because vested interest
and autonomy of district and facility staff is very high still and
they don’t listen to NHM staff (Middle manager—4).
Some actors used their autonomy and discretionary powers in a
positive way and facilitated the implementation to champion many
teething troubles. In the example above, a doctor (obstetrician 1),
used professional ethics and sense of duty as well as a position of in-
fluence to ensure that the client gets free services. Similarly,
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collaborative interface engagements of actors at central, state, dis-
trict and facility level helped to find solutions to major challenges
such as availability of certain medicines in a medical college hospital
and availability of ultrasound services in a district hospital.
Understanding patients need for free ultrasonography, we
allowed district and facility managers to do a tie-up with private.
One hospital was successful in negotiating a price per case, which
is very affordable to us. The same solution was offered to other
districts, but they couldn’t do it (Middle manager—2).
Constraining policy implementation and weakening of policy intent
While power dynamics in certain situations helped policy implemen-
tation, many practices of power led to a weakening of the policy in-
tent and failure to deliver JSSK promises. The weakening of policy
intent manifested through an overall fragmented implementation en-
vironment, a continuation of ambiguity in some procedures, incon-
sistent availability and irregular delivery of services, ignoring of or
deviating from procedural guidance, not finding solutions for per-
sisting problems, allowing practices of corruption and a gradual loss
of interest as well as efforts to deliver JSSK promises.
The hesitation of state actors to originally implement JSSK,
clubbed with an overall low system capacity to fulfil policy mandate
was dominated over by a central push. This meant that scheme mostly
started in a hurry and existed only on papers except for the patchy
provision of some services. There was no infrastructure for providing
free medicines, tests and ambulances and state was dependent on cen-
tral funds for implementation. The state also had to fight the powers
of the existing private market against delivering free services.
Now we have an adequate number of drop back ambulances if
you just count the number. . . But we still have people using per-
sonal vehicles to go back home. Why? . . .because most of them
don’t get it. . . .. Why is this so? Because some places have more
than the requirement and others, don’t get an ambulance when
needed. Politicians interfere in our rational placing of ambulan-
ces (Middle manager—3).
While these problems appear to be general systemic constraints,
our findings show that actor relationships and their power dynamics
contributed to many of these problems as highlighted in lifeworld
analysis section above as well as in Table 5. In general, the practices
of contestation and negotiations slowed down the implementation
while resistance and ignoring policy mandate often led to non-
delivery of services to clients. This can be cited with another example,
which was seen in case of a client (beneficiary -2 above), who had to
deliver the baby in a private hospital and incurred expenses about
INR 10 000 (about US$1400), by the time they reached back home.
The service providers, in this case, exercised their positional over and
prevailing practice of referrals to refer the client from two government
hospital citing the needs of higher-level medical care.
Discussion
Implementation decisions and actions in JSSK experience were influ-
enced by a complex interplay of practices of power which were
underpinned by lived social realties or the lifeworlds of the actors.
Everyday politics and power struggles of actors in this experience
reinforced the idea that implementing health policies is not a func-
tion of merely having an implementation blueprint. Instead, it is
influenced by the often neglected struggles of actors for resources,
benefits, control, meanings, recognition and moral–ethical standings
(Long, 2001). This builds on an actor centric understanding of
policy implementation (Erasmus et al., 2014; Gilson et al., 2014;
Sheikh et al., 2014) and reinforces the notion that actors make
meanings of their surrounding realities in relation to policy proc-
esses, and day to day decisions and actions are a function of actors’
power struggles (Long, 2001).
We noted that power was not always poised negatively as an in-
fluence on the implementation process but had positive effects as
seen is some examples of clear decision making and collaborative
uses of power to solve problems. Understanding positive and con-
structive uses of power in implementation can help in solving imple-
mentation challenges which are nested in power asymmetries in the
health systems (Erasmus et al., 2014; Sriram et al., 2018; Gore and
Parker, 2019). We found that implementation was facilitated
strongly in examples where actors used their lifeworld experiences
to deliver JSSK benefits to clients. On the contrary, a misalignment
of lifeworld constructs with policy intent hampered the delivery of
JSSK benefits to clients. Interpersonal relations and tensions over
implementation processes slowed down the implementation process.
As noted in the example of push from central actors to roll out the
policy, the state actors and local private shop owners antagonized
the policy intent, which constrained delivery of JSSK promises in
early years. JSSK promises were further undermined by the prevail-
ing interests and practices of doctors related to private prescriptions
for medicines and tests. However, in some cases, higher functional
autonomy of doctors, coupled with their professional ethics and
moral sense of duty helped in the delivery of JSSK promises to
patients.
Based on the findings of this study, we have depicted the rela-
tionships of the formation of actor interfaces and practices of power,
a dynamicinteraction of three lifeworld categories and their effect
on implementation in Figure 1.
Based on this experience, we argue that investment in under-
standing lived experiences of policy actors can enable researchers
and policymakers, to find means for harnessing positive influences
of power during policy implementation. Possibly, this can help in
building systems which can harness the full potential of individual
actors towards meeting policy and programme objectives. This is
important because the power practices could exist in subtle manners
and can be rooted beyond visible power structures, as observed in
this study. These could be related to commonly neglected constructs
like organizational culture and trust (Gilson et al., 2014; Erasmus
et al., 2017), discretionary use of power by front line actors (Lipsky,
1980 ; Gilson, 2015) as well as agency, interests, norms, values and
socio-cultural worldviews of actors (Sheikh and Porter, 2010;
Hudson and Lefttwich, 2014). All of these may contribute to every-
day struggles of actors over resources, meanings and control (Long
and Liu, 2009) and shape the course of policy implementation.
While the broader implementation literature acknowledges the
actor relationships and power as key influences on policy process
(Walt and Gilson, 1994; Erasmus and Gilson, 2008; Erasmus et al.,
2014; Gilson et al., 2014, 2018), there is a relative dearth of
approaches to inform an analysis which considers everyday politics
of actors and their power practices (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008;
Sriram et al., 2018). This experience informs that, as a complemen-
tary approach to commonly applied frameworks of power (Lipsky,
1980; Lukes, 2005; Gaventa, 2006; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2007),
‘actor interface analysis’ can offer nuanced steps of power analysis
in health policy implementation. First, it provides an entry point to
locate practices of power in interface of actors as observed in acts of
domination, control, contestation, negotiation, consent, collabor-
ation or resistance. Second, using actor lifeworlds as an analytical
frame (Table 1), it can help to understand how lived realities of
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actors, which are embedded in their personal, organizational and
social-cultural experiences manifest in the formation of actor inter-
faces, can lead to power struggles and can ultimately modify policy
implementation.
Limitations
One of the limitations of this analysis is that there could be multiple
actor interfaces in an implementation experience, and all interfaces
in JSSK experience could not be elicited in this paper. Second, the
overall implementation of JSSK or any health policy for that matter
is not shaped only by practices of power and many other influences
matter. However, as the focus of this paper was to illustrate the role
of practices of power on implementation, its scope remained limited
to this aspect. Third, the paper focuses mostly on showcasing ‘how
actor interface analysis was conducted’ and ‘how it can be used to
explain power practices’. This which leaves out many discussions
about how these learnings can be used for improving implementa-
tion given the scope of this paper and a permissible length.
Conclusion
‘Actor interface analysis’ has been used in health policy implementa-
tion explicitly in two published studies only (Lehmann and Gilson,
2013; Barasa et al., 2016) but can be useful to inform more imple-
mentation analyses. This paper, for the first time, outlines steps to
use this approach in implementation analysis while offering a guid-
ing framework (Table 1) to inform such analysis. However, this ap-
proach should be tested in more empirical studies for- further
nuancing of ‘actor interfaces’ as a concept; detailing of ‘actor life-
worlds’ as a guiding framework for power analysis and to under-
stand the influence of power struggles on implementation in varying
contexts. While the day to day politics and power dynamics played
out significantly in the implementation of JSSK, these cannot be seen
in isolation. Such power practices were also a function of overall
low capacity and readiness of the state health system to deliver free
services, which were separately examined in this study.
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